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1 Introduction
In recent models with heterogeneous rms international trade integration has a positive impact
on aggregate productivity through the selection of the best rms (Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz,
2003). The reason is a combination of import competition and export market access. On the one
hand, as lower trade costs allow foreign producers to target the domestic markets, the operating
prots of domestic rms in those markets shrink whatever their productivities. On the other
hand, some domestic rms gain access to foreign markets and get additional prots from their
foreign ventures. These are the rms that are productive enough to cope with the additional costs
of foreign activity (such as those due to transportation and remaining administrative duties or
institutional and cultural barriers). The result is the partition of the initially active domestic rms
in three groups. As they start making losses in their home markets without gaining access to
foreign markets, the least productive rms are forced to exit. On the contrary, as they are able to
compensate lost prots on home sales with new prots on foreign sales, the most productive rms
survive and expand their market shares. Finally, rms with intermediate levels of productivity
also survive but, not being productive enough to access foreign markets, are relegated to home
sales only and their market shares fall. Since international trade integration eliminates the least
productive rms, average productivity grows through the reallocation of productive resources from
less to more e¢ cient producers.
This mechanism nds empirical support in rm-level analyses that have tried to identify the
direction of causation hidden in the positive correlation between the export status of a rm and
its productivity (called exceptional exporter performanceby Bernard and Jensen, 1999). This
is a crucial issue for trade policy. Causation going from export status to rm performance would
reveal the existence of learning by exportingand therefore call for export promotion. However,
apart from peculiar cases, most of the evidence supports reverse causation in the form of selection
into export status: rms that already perform better have a stronger propensity to export than
other rms (Tybout, 2002). Selection comes with two additional e¤ects that are consistent with
the theoretical argument discussed above. First, exposure to trade forces the least productive
rms to shut down (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw, Chung and
Roberts, 2000). Second, trade liberalization leads to market share reallocations towards the most
productive rms (Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2003). On both counts, aggregate
average productivity improves.
The empirical relevance of the selection e¤ect motivates additional e¤orts towards quantifying
its contribution in terms of gains from trade. This line of research is heralded by Tybout (2002) and
pursued by Bernard et al. (2003) through the simulation of counterfactual scenarios. These authors
start with noting that the di¤erences in measured productivity (e.g. value added per worker) across
rms can be generated only by theoretical models assuming imperfect competition. Two options are
then available. Di¤erences can be derived from constant markups (i.e. Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition) together with xed costs of entry and of exporting. This is the option chosen by
Melitz (2003). Alternatively, di¤erences can be obtained from variable markups even without any
xed cost. This is the option chosen by Bernard et al. (2003), who propose a model obtained by
introducing Bertrand competition in the probabilistic Ricardian framework developed by Eaton and
Kortum (2002). They then calibrate the parameters of their model on U.S. data. In particular, they
use aggregate production and trade data among the 47 leading U.S. export destinations (including
the U.S. itself) to calibrate the parameters governing geographic barriers, aggregate technology
di¤erences, and di¤erences in input costs. U.S. plant level data are used, instead, to calibrate the
parameters that relate to the heterogeneity of goods in production and consumption. Finally, the
calibrated model is used to assess the impacts of various counterfactual scenarios. In the focal
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one, Bernard et al. (2003) report a 4:7 percent increase in the average productivity of U.S. rms
resulting from a 5 percent reduction in world trade barriers.1
The counterfactual analysis by Bernard et al. (2003) reveals the empirical tractability of their
model. Their treatment of market structure implies, however, some analytical shortcoming. First
of all, a certain good in a certain country is always supplied by one rm only. This is the lowest-cost
supplier of that good to that country. Indeed, under Bertrand competition, all other rms are kept
out through limit pricing: the lowest-cost producer quotes a price that matches the second-lowest
cost of supplying that good to that country. Accordingly, to derive the price and markup quoted
for each good in each country, one needs to know which rms are the lowest and the second-lowest
cost suppliers from each potential source country. This problem becomes tractable if one is ready
to assume that in each country the lowest and the second-lowest costs are realizations of random
variables drawn from probability distributions. In this respect, Bernard et al. (2003) show that the
Fréchet family yields tractable distributions for prices and markups along with simple expressions
for bilateral trade shares. As a result, however, the equilibrium distribution of markups is invariant
to country characteristics and to geographic barriers, which are crucial features of the real world.
Moreover, in Bernard et al. (2003), rmsentry does not respond to market protability. This
removes an important channel through which industry equilibrium is eventually restored and gives
the model a strong short-run avor. Di¤erently, building on Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition,
the model of Melitz (2003) allows many producers with di¤erent costs to simultaneously serve the
same market, which is consistent even with arm-chair evidence. This model, however, is analytically
tractable only if countries are identical and all bilateral trade barriers are the same. This clearly
undermines empirical calibration and makes the model a fairly unpromising tool to deal with
counterfactual analysis. Moreover, its implication of constant and equal markups across all rms,
no matter where they produce and sell, ies in the face of empirical evidence showing that markups
do vary across rms and markets (Tybout, 2002).2
The aim of the present paper is to supplement the existing literature in two respects. First, we
perform a counterfactual analysis in the case of monopolistic competition to match what has been
achieved by Bernard et al. (2003) with Bertrand competition. Second, in so doing we propose a
multi-sector empirical implementation of the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), who obtain
variable markups in a highly tractable asymmetric multi-country framework with monopolistic
competition, thus overcoming some of the theoretical limitations of both the Bertrand and Dixit-
Stiglitz models. In so doing we extend the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) to allow for many
sectors and we calibrate it on a dataset that covers aggregate and rm-level evidence on a panel of 11
EU countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst analysis that uses comparable individual
panel data across countries to investigate how trade integration a¤ects aggregate productivity in
the presence of rm selection.
After showing that our calibrated model reproduces reasonably well some moments of the un-
1Recent evidence on the existence of causation from trade to aggregate income and productivity is provided by
Frankel and Rose (2002), who nd per capita income to be positively a¤ected by the formation of currency unions,
thanks to their positive impact on trade, and by Alcalà and Ciccone (2004), who report strong support for a positive
causal e¤ect of trade on labor productivity. With respect to our analysis, Alcalà and Ciccone (2004) provide the
interesting insight that, at the aggregate level, such a positive causation mainly acts through total factor productivity.
2Other related contributions include Asplund and Nocke (2005) as well as Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006).
The former investigate the e¤ect of market size on entry and exit rates in a monopolistically competitive industry
with linear demand and hence variable markups. They focus, however, on a closed economy. The latter present a
model of comparative advantage and heterogenous rms where country size matters for the aggregate productivity
responses to trade liberalization. They use, however, CES preferences and focus on a two-country set-up. The
analytical tractability of the multi-country case is the comparative advantage of the model by Melitz and Ottaviano
(2005) we extend and calibrate.
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derlying rm-level sales and exports distributions, we simulate it to explore two scenarios. In the
rst scenario, we assess the productivity losses that would be associated with autarky (costs of
non-Europe).3 We nd that, if in 2000 trade had been inhibited altogether, average productivity
would have dropped by roughly 13 percent. This would have mapped into a 16 percentage increases
in average markups and average prices. As less productive smaller rms would have been able to
enter and survive, average prots (quantities) would have fallen by 23 (31) per cent.4 A similar
thought experiment is performed by Eaton and Kortum (2002) in their probabilistic Ricardian
framework applied to a sample of 19 OECD countries in 1990. Using aggregate data, they calculate
that the average productivity loss associated with autarky for our 11 countries is equal to roughly 4
per cent. The di¤erence may be explained by the fact that they do not have imperfect competition,
their base year pre-dates ours by a decade, and OECD countries are generally less integrated than
EU ones. The second scenario is designed to assess the productivity gains from further integra-
tion (gains from (freer) trade). For the sake of comparison we follow Bernard et al. (2003) and
study the impact of a 5 per cent reduction in trade barriers. We nd that in 2000 such reduction
would have caused an average productivity increase of roughly 2 per cent with 2 percentage falls in
average prices and markups as well as a 5 percentage increase in average prots. The increase in
productivity is smaller than the increase of roughly 5 per cent obtained by Bernard et al. (2003)
for the US. Although the two outcomes may appear to di¤er considerably, it is worth noting that
US productivity is higher than the average European productivity. Indeed, when focusing on the
most productive countries in our European sample, namely Germany and Denmark, we get very
similar e¤ects (respectively, 4:6 and 4:4 per cent). More generally, in both scenarios we nd that
productivity gains vary a lot across countries and sectors depending on market accessibility and
trade costs.5 To sum up, both scenarios suggest that trade among our 11 EU countries, which
represents 54 per cent of their overall trade and 22 per cent of national manufacturing production,
has a sizeable impact on their productivity.6
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 derives its equilibrium properties, then designs the calibration and simulation strategy.
Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 calibrates the model. Section 6 discusses the models
t to data and simulates alternative integration scenarios. Section 7 provides evidence that our
results are robust to alternative distance and productivity measures. Section 8 concludes.
3The expression cost of non-Europewas introduced to refer to the economic cost of failing to complete the common
market. This is the subject of a landmark study by the European Commission, the Cecchini report, presented in
March 1988.
4As we will discuss, there is no obvious way to calibrate the preference parameters. Hence, we are not able to
assess the quantitative impact of counterfactual scenarios on the number of rms and, therefore, on overall welfare.
Nevertheless, in the theoretical model indirect utility turns out to be positively correlated with average productivity
irrespective of the number of rms.
5Smith and Venables (1988) simulate the e¤ects of a reduction of intra-EU trade costs in a model with imperfect
competition and homogeneous rms. Their estimated reductions in average prices are distinctively smaller than ours
(see Section 6.2). This reveals the importance of allowing for rms heterogeneity and selection e¤ects. Also related
to our work is the vast literature on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE). Di¤erently from the CGE approach,
our analysis is not conceived as an evaluation of the overall e¤ects of a given policy, but rather as an exercise of
comparative statics carried out under the ceteris paribus assumption. In particular, it is better understood as an
attempt to isolate the implications of endogenous productivity, which is usually taken as given by the CGE literature
(Haaland and Norman,1992).
6 In our model the European countries we consider are not allowed to trade with the rest of the world. The reason
is that constrained rm-level data availability prevents us from exploring the trade creation and trade diversion e¤ects
of the simulated scenarios.
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2 The model
Our model is based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2005, Appendix B and C) who consider an economy
made of M countries (indexed by l = 1; :::;M). Country l hosts Ll consumers, each supplying
one unit of labor inelastically and labor is the only factor of production. Moreover, countries are
allowed to di¤er in terms of sizes, trade costs and technological opportunities. We further enrich
this setup by introducing several sectors and technological asymmetries across sectors.
2.1 Preferences and demand
Preferences are dened by a quasi-linear utility function over S horizontally di¤erentiated goods,
indexed by s = 1; :::; S, and a homogenous good chosen as numeraire. Each di¤erentiated good s is
composed by a continuum of varieties indexed by i 2 
s. All consumers share the same preferences
in all countries and the same income in each country. The utility function for a typical consumer
in country l is given by
U l = dl0 +
SX
s=1
8<:s
Z
i2
s
dls(i)di 
1
2
s
Z
i2
s
h
dls(i)
i2
di  1
2
s
 Z
i2
s
dls(i)di
!29=; ; (1)
where dl0 and d
l
s(i) represent the individual consumption levels of the numeraire good and variety
i of good s. The demand parameters s, s, and s are all positive. For each di¤erentiated
good s, the parameters s and s index the substitution pattern between its varieties and the
numeraire: increases in s and decreases in s both shift out the demand for the di¤erentiated
varieties relative to the numeraire. The parameter s indexes the degree of product di¤erentiation
between the varieties of good s. In the limit when s = 0, consumers only care about their total
consumption level over all varieties of that good, Dls =
R
i2
s d
l
s(i)di. Such varieties are then perfect
substitutes. The degree of product di¤erentiation increases with s as consumers give increasing
weight to the distribution of consumption levels across varieties.
The marginal utilities for all goods are bounded, and a consumer may thus not have positive
demand for any particular good. We assume that consumers have positive demands for the nu-
meraire good (dl0 > 0). The inverse demand by country l for each variety i of good s is then given
by
pls(i) = s   sdls(i)  sDls; (2)
whenever demand dls(i) > 0. Let e
ls  
ls be the subset of varieties of good s consumed in country
l. Then (2) can be inverted to yield the linear market demand system for these varieties:
qls(i)  Lldls(i) =
sL
l
sN
l
s + s
  L
l
s
pls(i) +
sN
l
s
sN
l
s + s
Ll
s
pls; 8i 2 e
ls; (3)
where N ls is the measure of consumed varieties in e
ls and pls =  1=N ls Ri2e
ls pls(i)di is their average
price. The set e
ls is the largest subset of 
ls that satises
pls(i) 
1
sN
l
s + s

ss + sN
l
sp
l
s

 pls: (4)
Any price above s must violate this condition since the marginal utility in (2) is bounded above
by s; hence pls  s (the inequality must be strict when there is any price heterogeneity). For a
given level of product di¤erentiation s, lower average prices p
l
s or a larger number of competing
varieties N ls induce an increase in the price elasticity of demand and decrease the price bound (or
choke price) dened in (4). On both counts, lower pls or a larger N
l
s generate a toughercompetitive
environment.
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2.2 Production and rm behavior
There is only one factor of production, labor, which is internationally immobile and inelastically
supplied in segmented national market under perfect competition. The production of the numeraire
good faces constant returns to scale and unit cost. Also this good is traded in a competitive
market, which is however perfectly integrated among countries. These assumptions imply a unit
wage everywhere as long as the numeraire good is produced in all countries, which is henceforth
assumed. Entry in each di¤erentiated product sector is modeled as a research and development
(R&D) process with uncertain outcome. Specically, each entrant has to invent its own variety and
a corresponding production process by making an irreversible investment of f ls units of numeraire,
which is sector and country specic. In so doing a prospective entrant knows it is going to nd a
new variety for sure and that production will occur under constant returns to scale. It does not
know, however, the marginal cost of production c as this will be randomly determined only after the
investment in R&D has been sunk. In each country l and sector s uncertainty is modeled as a draw
from a common and known distribution Gls(c), with support [0; c
l
A;s], which varies across sectors
and countries. This allows us to introduce (probabilistic) comparative advantagestemming from
technological di¤erences that a¤ect the distribution of rm-level productivity draws. For example,
if

clA;s=c
l
A;r

<

chA;s=c
h
A;r

, countries l and h are said to have comparative advantages in sectors
s and r respectively: relative to entrants in h (l), entrants in l (h) have a better chanceof getting
lower cost draws in sector s than in sector r.7
Since the entry cost fs is sunk, only rms that can cover their marginal cost survive and produce.
All other entrants exit without even starting production. Surviving rms maximize their prots
facing the demand function (3). Given the continuum of competitors, a rm takes the average
price level pls and numbers of rm N
l
s as given. This is the essence of monopolistic competition.
Moreover, national markets are segmented, although rms can produce in one market and sell in the
other, incurring a per-unit trade cost. The overall cost of a delivered unit with cost c from country
h to country l is hls c with 
lh
s > 1, where (
hl
s   1)c is the frictional trade cost. We interpret such
cost in a wide sense as stemming from all distance-related barriers. For this reason, even within
countries, trade may not be costless and we allow for  lls  1.
Let plhs (c) and q
lh
s (c) represent the levels of the prot maximizing price and quantity sold for a
rm in sector s producing in country l with cost c and selling to country h. Since national markets
are segmented and rms produce under constant returns to scale, they independently maximize
the prots earned from sales to di¤erent countries. Let lhs (c) =

plhs (c)   lhs c

qlhs (c) denote the
maximized value of these prots as a function of the rms marginal cost c. Then the prot
maximizing prices and output levels must satisfy: qlhs (c) =
 
Lh=s
 
plhs (c)   lhs c

. Only rms
earning non-negative prots in a market will choose to sell in that market. This leads to similar
cost cuto¤ rules for rms selling in the various markets. Let clhs denote the upper bound cost
inclusive of trade costs (delivered cost) for rms producing in economy l and selling to economy
h. Recalling (4), this (endogenous) cost cuto¤ must then satisfy:
clhs = sup
n
 lhs c : 
lh
s (c) > 0
o
= phs (5)
This implies clhs = c
kh
s = c
hh
s for all l; k = 1; :::;M . Note that, for given p
h
s , higher trade barriers
from l to h make it harder for exporters from l to break even relative to their competitors from
k as the former need better cost draws then the latter to break even. The cost cuto¤s summarize
all the e¤ects of market conditions relevant for rm performance. In particular, the optimal prices
and output levels can be written as:
7See Section 3.1 for additional details.
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plhs (c) =
1
2
(chhs + 
lh
s c); q
lh
s (c) =
Lh
2s

chhs    lhs c

(6)
which yield the following maximized prot levels:
lhs (c) =
Lh
4s

chhs    lhs c
2
(7)
with markup:
lhs (c) =
1
2

chhs   hls c

(8)
Firms choose a production location prior to entry and sink the corresponding entry cost f ls. Free
entry of rms in economy l then implies zero expected prots in equilibrium:
MX
h=1
"Z chhs = lhs
0
lhs (c)dG
l
s(c)
#
= f ls: (9)
The M cost cuto¤s can be calculated by substituting (7) into (9) and solving the resulting system
ofM equations for l = 1; :::;M . The number of sellers to each country can be found by substituting
(5) into (4) and solving the M resulting equations individually:
Nhs =
2s
s
s   chhs
chhs   chs
; (10)
where chs =
PM
l=1
nhR clhs
0 
lh
s cdG
l
s(c)
i
=Gls(c
lh
s )
o
is the average delivered cost of sellers.
3 Equilibrium
We are now ready to determine the equilibrium distribution of rms across countries and the
associated trade ows.
3.1 Parametrization of technology
All the results derived in the previous section hold for any distribution of cost drawsGls(c). However,
to implement the model empirically, we use a specic parametrization for the distribution whose
empirical relevance will then be tested. In particular, we assume that in sector s and country l
productivity draws 1=c follow a Pareto distribution with lower productivity bound 1=clA;s and shape
parameter ks  1. This implies a distribution of cost draws c given by
Gls(c) =
 
c
clA;s
!ks
; c 2 [0; clA;s]: (11)
The shape parameter ks indexes the dispersion of cost draws in sector s and it is the same in all
countries. When ks = 1, the cost distribution is uniform on [0; clA;s]. As ks increases, the relative
number of high cost rms increases, and the cost distribution is more concentrated at these higher
cost levels. As ks goes to innity, the distribution becomes degenerate at clA;s. Any truncation of
the cost distribution from above at chhs =
lh
s < c
l
A;s retains the same distribution function and shape
parameter ks. The productivity distribution of rms producing in l and selling to h is therefore also
Pareto with shape ks, and the truncated cost distribution is given by Glhs (c) = [c=(c
hh
s =
lh
s )]
ks ; c 2
[0; chhs =
lh
s ].
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3.2 Cuto¤s
Let lhs 
 
 lhs
 ks 2 (0; 1] measure the freenessof trade for exports from l to h, which allows us
to dene the following trade freeness matrix for sector s:
Ps 
0BBB@
11s 
12
s    1Ms
21s 
22
s    2Ms
...
...
. . .
...
M1s 
M2
s    MMs
1CCCA :
Given our parametrization, the free entry condition (9) in country l can be rewritten as:
MX
h=1
lhs L
h

chhs
ks+2
=
2s(ks + 1)(ks + 2)f
l
s
 ls
l = 1; :::;M; (12)
where  ls =

clA;s
 ks
is an index of absolute advantage in sector s. This yields a system of M
equations that can be solved for the M equilibrium domestic cuto¤s in sector s using Cramers
rule:
chhs =
 
2(ks + 1)(ks + 2)s
jPsj
PM
l=1
C lhs  =( ls=f ls)
Lh
! 1
ks+2
h = 1; :::;M; (13)
where jPsj is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix and
C lhs  is the cofactor of its lhs element.
Cross-country di¤erences in cuto¤s arise from three sources: own country size (Lh), as well as a com-
bination of market accessibility, entrry barriers and comparative advantage (
PM
l=1
C lhs  =( ls=f ls)).
Countries beneting from a larger local market, a better distribution of productivity draws, lower
barriers to entry and better market accessibility have lower cuto¤s.
3.3 Performance Variables
Under the Pareto assumption, average performance variables for sellers in country h can be ex-
pressed as functions of the domestic cuto¤s (13). In particular, average (delivered) costs, prices,
quantities, markups and operating prots evaluate to:
chs =
ks
ks + 1
chhs
phs =
2ks + 1
2 (ks + 1)
chhs
qhs = (ks + 2)
PM
l=1
C lhs  =   ls=f ls
jPsj

chhs
 (ks+1)
(14)
hs =
1
2 (ks + 1)
chhs
hs =
PM
l=1
C lhs  =   ls=f ls
jPsj

chhs
 ks
These results point out that smaller cuto¤s generate smaller average costs, prices and markups
as well as larger average quantities and prots. In particular, a percentage change in the cuto¤
chhs has the same percentage impact on both the average markup 
h
s (pro-competitive e¤ect) and
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the average cost chs (selection e¤ect). Through these channels, a percentage change in the cuto¤
translates into an indentical percentage change in the average price. Each channel is responsible
for half of the impact since (14) implies phs = (2ks + 1)
p
hs c
h
s=2ks. Finally, a percentage change
in the cuto¤s generates changes of  (ks + 1) and  ks per cent in average quantities and prots
respectively.
3.4 Number of Firms
Turning to the number of rms, the mass of sellers Nhs is obtained from (10) after substituting the
value of chs in (14):
Nhs =
2s(ks + 1)
s
s   chhs
chhs
(15)
Sellers consist of domestic producers and foreign exporters. Accordingly, given a positive mass of
entrants N lE;s in all countries, N
h
s equals
PM
l=1G
l
s(c
hh
s =
lh
s )N
l
E;s. By (5) and (11), this equality
provides a system of M linear equations
MX
l=1
lhs  
l
sN
l
E;s =
Nhs
(chhs )
ks
:
that can be solved for the number of entrants in the M countries using Cramers rule:
N lE;s =
2 (ks + 1) s
s jPsj ls
MX
h=1
 
s   chhs
 C lhs 
(chhs )
ks+1
(16)
Given N lE;s entrants in country l, N
l
E;sG
l
s(c
ll
s =
ll
s ) rms survive and produce for the local market.
Among them, N lE;sG
l
s(c
hh
s =
lh
s ) export to country h. Thus, the measure of producers located in
country l is:
N lP;s =  
l
sN
l
E;s
ll
s

clls
ks
(17)
3.5 Trade ows
Our model yields a gravity equation for aggregate bilateral trade ows. In sector s an exporter from
l to h with cost c generates f.o.b. export sales rlhs (c) = p
lh
s (c)q
lh
s (c). Aggregating these export sales
rlhs (c) over all exporters from l to h (with cost c  chhs = lhs ) yields the aggregate bilateral exports
in sector s from l to h. Expressions (5) and (6) then imply aggregate bilateral exports equal to:
EXP lhs =
1
2s (ks + 2)
N lE;s 
l
sL
h

chhs
ks+2
lhs (18)
This is a gravity equation in so far as it determines bilateral exports as a (log-linear) function
of bilateral trade barriers and country characteristics. In particular, it reects the combined e¤ects
of country size, technology (comparative advantage), and geography (accessibility) on both the
extensive (number of traded goods) and intensive (amount traded per good) margins of trade
ows.8 It highlights how a lower cuto¤ chhs dampens exports by making it harder for potential
exporters to break into that market.
8See Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004) for similar results derived from
di¤erent models.
9
3.6 Welfare
Due to free entry, prots are zero both ex-ante and ex-post. Hence, a simple measure of welfare
generated by the M sectors in economy l is consumer surplus. Given our linear demand system,
that amounts to:
U l =
SX
s=1
1
2s

s   clls

s   ks + 1
ks + 2
clls

: (19)
Hence, welfare increases monotonically with the domestic cost cuto¤.
3.7 From theory to simulation
How large are the productivity gains from EU integration due to the impact of freer trade on
competition and selection? Our model can be used to address this question by building on equations
(13) and (18). In so doing, we proceed in two stages. We start with calibrating the model. Then
we use the calibrated model to investigate the e¤ects of di¤erent integration scenarios.
In the calibration stage, we rst use trade and geographical data for the year 2000 to recover
the sectoral freeness of trade lhs =
 
 lhs
 ks from the gravity equation (18). This allows us to
get the freeness matrix Ps and to compute its determinant and co-factors that appear in equation
(13). We then use a database on manufacturing rms belonging to 11 EU countries to estimate
individual total factor productivities (TFP) for the year 2000.9 From such productivities we recover
two additional elements of equation (13): the shape parameters of the underlying sectoral Pareto
distributions (ks) and the MxS endogenous domestic cut-o¤s (chhs ). Using the computed values
of Ps, ks and chhs together with data on population L
h, we nally use (12) to obtain the index
of absolute advantage and entry barriers  ls=f
l
s (up to a sector-specic constant related to the
unobservable s).
In the simulation stage, we run a counterfactual analysis on the calibrated model. In particular,
we simulate the changes in productivity due to di¤erent trade costs by recomputing chhs for alter-
native freeness matrices Ps. Using equations (14) we can then map changes in chhs to changes in
average costs, markups, prices, quantities and prots. Two scenarios are considered. One in which
international trade costs are prohibitive (lhs = 0 for l 6= h) and one in which international trade
costs ( lhs for l 6= h) are reduced by 5 per cent. The rst scenario provides us with an assessment
of the costs of non-Europe. The second scenario gives us a measure of the gains from (freer)
trade, that is, the gains from further integration. Unfortunately, there is no way to calibrate the
preference parameters of a linear utility without demand and price data and these are unavailable
for our sample of rms. Furthermore, it is not possible to take such estimates from other studies
because parameter values are unit of measurement dependent. Hence, we are not able to assess the
quantitative impact of counterfactual scenarios on the number of rms and, therefore, on overall
welfare. Nevertheless, (19) and (14) show that indirect utility is positively correlated with average
productivity irrespective of the number of rms.
4 Data
In our empirical analysis we take advantage of di¤erent datasets. For the productivity estimations
we extensively use the Amadeus database provided by Bureau Van Dijk. This dataset gives (har-
monized) yearly balance-sheet information on the biggest 250,000 European rms for the period
9We believe TFP is a much better measure of individual rm productivity than value added per worker used in
other studies like Bernard et al. (2003). However, in unreported results, we have also experimented with value added
per worker at the rm level nding very similar results.
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1994-2003. To the best of our knowledge, it is the only dataset that provides comparable individual
gures for a relatively large group of countries. In particular, Amadeus provides information on
value added, xed assets (capital), sales, and the cost of materials (intermediates consumption)
in thousands of euros, as well as on the number of employees. We focus on manufacturing rms
in western Europe for the year 2000. We choose that year because of the quality of the data and
the fact that no major economic change took place. We consider only those countries for which a
reasonable data coverage exists. We eliminate missing values and extreme observations, dened as
having either a capital/employees or value added/employees ratio which is out of the range iden-
tied by the 1st and the 99th percentile. This leaves us with a sample of 22,120 rms across 11
countries as listed in Table 1.10
Table 1: Data coverage across countries for the year 2000 (Amadeus only).
Country initials Country Frequency Percent
BE Belgium 1557 7.04
DE Germany 385 1.74
DK Denmark 309 1.40
ES Spain 2730 12.34
FI Finland 529 2.39
FR France 3956 17.88
GB Great Britain 4514 20.41
IT Italy 5735 25.93
NL Netherlands 861 3.89
PT Portugal 156 0.71
SE Sweden 1388 6.27
Total 22120 100
As one can see in the table, data coverage for Germany, which is the biggest EU economy, is
rather poor. This is the reason why we complement our Amadeus data with information coming
from the MIP database on German rms provided by the Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschafts-
forschung (ZEW). The MIP database has relatively smaller rms than Amadeus. However, the
productivity of German rms in the two samples is not much di¤erent and both samples reveal
that Germany is the most productive country. The MIP contains information on value added,
employment and input consumption. The capital variable is reconstructed by using the book value
of capital in 1998, adding investments at the end of the period and applying the relevant dea-
tors. After eliminating missing as well as extreme observations, the MIP database provides us with
roughly 700 additional rms. Although our results are virtually the same when we use the Amadeus
data only, the actual sample we rely on for productivity estimations contains those additional rms.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables in the combined Amadeus-MIP database are given in
Table 2.
As a benchmark we estimate rm-level productivity by simple OLS in the year 2000. However,
one may wonder to what extent our results are robust to considering more accurate estimators of
productivity. To address this concern, in Section 7.1 we also implement the approach by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003), which uses intermediates consumption to control for unobservables.11 As panel
10Sample statistics suggest that observations are missing at random within each country so that our sample seems
to be representative.
11The alternative approach by Olley and Pakes (1996), which uses investment to control for unobservables, can not
be applied to the Amadeus database because this does not contain any information on rmsinvestments.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the OLS estimation dataset (Amadeus and MIP).
N. rms Mean St. dev. Min Max
Sales 22801 146008.9 1739573 2 162000000
Value added 22801 47083.5 511309 18 44500000
Capital 22801 72865.69 937859.3 8 89100000
Intermed. consumpt. 22801 57920.58 428622.7 1 26900000
Employees 22801 667.84 6027.05 1 449594
Note: All variables except Employees are in thousands of euros.
information is needed in this case, we build another dataset using years 1998, 1999 and 2000.
When eliminating missing (as well as extreme) observations for intermediates consumption, the
combined Amadeus-MIP sample is reduced to approximately 14,500 rms per year (for a total of
42,663 observations in the three years). This reduction is mainly due to the fact that there is no
information available on rmsinput consumption for Great Britain and Denmark. This explains
why, as detailed in Table 3, the panel for the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure covers 9 countries only.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables used from this panel dataset are given in Table 4.
Table 3: Data coverage across countries for the Levinsohn and Petrin estimation (Amadeus and
MIP): years 1998-1999-2000.
Country initials Country Frequency Percent
BE Belgium 4107 9.63
DE Germany 2202 5.16
ES Spain 6603 15.48
FI Finland 1290 3.02
FR France 9951 23.32
IT Italy 15399 36.09
NL Netherlands 987 2.31
PT Portugal 294 0.69
SE Sweden 1830 4.29
Total 42663 100.00
Turning to the industry disaggregation, we work with a 18 sectors breakdown of manufacturing
activities, which derives from merging the information contained in the Amadeus and MIP databases
 organized by 2-digits Nace rev. 1 and thus leading to 23 manufacturing sectors  with that
contained in the database we use to compute trade costs (see below) organized by 3-digits ISIC
rev 2 and thus leading to 26 manufacturing industries. The resulting industry disaggregation is
detailed in Table 5.
The data we use to compute trade costs are provided by the Centre dEtude Prospectives et
dInformations Internationales (CEPII). The main dataset, used in Mayer and Zignago (2005),
involves trade and production gures in a compatible ISIC 3-digit classication for a large set of
countries over the 1976-2001 period.12 These data allow us to recover both the internal (EXP lls )
and the external (EXP lhs with l 6= h) ows of goods. To estimate the freeness of trade lhs from the
12For details, see http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the Levinsohn and Petrin estimation dataset (Amadeus and MIP).
N. rms Mean St. dev. Min Max
Sales 42663 92577.97 699496.4 1 65700000
Value added 42663 26198.83 232179.1 12 19700000
Capital 42663 35942.36 385963.2 4 35700000
Intermed. consumpt. 42663 47006.06 308579.9 1 26900000
Employees 42663 385.53 2142.79 1 142881
Note: All variables except Employees are in thousands of euros.
Table 5: Sectoral disaggregation.
Industry code Industry description
1 Food beverages and tobacco
2 Textiles
3 Wearing apparel except footwear
4 Leather products and footwear
5 Wood products except furniture
6 Paper products
7 Printing and Publishing
8 Petroleum and coal
9 Chemicals
10 Rubber and plastic
11 Other non-metallic mineral products
12 Metallic products
13 Fabricated metal products
14 Machinery except electrical
15 Electric machinery
16 Professional and scientic equipment
17 Transport equipment
18 Other manufacturing
gravity equation (18), we complement trade and production data with geographical variables, in
particular bilateral distances and common language indicators, which are also provided by CEPII.
For both geographical variables several alternative measures are available.13. To recover the bilateral
trade costs for our 11 countries in 2000, we consider trade among 15 European countries (our 11
countries plus Austria, Greece, Ireland and Norway) in the years from 1999 to 2001. We use
a larger number of countries and three years to obtain more accurate measures. Table 6 shows
descriptive statistics of the trade and geographical variables. The data are organized by ows and
the number of observations (12,150) is given by the number of origins (M = 15), times the number
of destinations (M = 15), times the number of sectors (S = 18), times the number of years (which
are 3).
The variable EXP lhs in the table corresponds to trade ows (both internal and external) in
thousands of US dollars. The common language variable is a dummy indicating whether a couple
13For details, see http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the trade and geographical variables used.
N. observ. Mean St. dev. Min Max
EXP lhs 12150 746444.9 4308752 0 113000000
Common language 12150 0.06 0.24 0 1
dist 12150 1320.49 767.00 68.44 3362.98
distcap 12150 1333.98 760.74 68.44 3362.98
distw 12150 1344.83 732.85 66.78 3383.27
distwces 12150 1288.80 757.22 13.18 3364.83
Population 11 32159.82 28060.35 5176.209 82211.51
Note: EXP lhs is in thousands of US dollars while all distance variables are in
km. The common language variable is a dummy while population is in
thousands of inhabitants.
of countries share a common o¢ cial language.14 The distance variables are in km and cover sim-
ple measures (dist and distcap) and weighted measures (distw and distwces). Simple (geodesic)
distances are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses the latitudes and longitudes
of the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) for the dist variable and the
geographic coordinates of the capital cities for the distcap variable. Both variables incorporate in-
ternal distances that, as in the theoretical model, are allowed to be non-zero. As in Head and Mayer
(2002, 2004), the internal distance dll of country l is calculated from its area as dll = (2=3)
p
areal=.
This formula models the average distance between a producer and a consumer on a stylized geog-
raphy where all producers are centrally located and the consumers uniformly distributed across a
disk-shaped region.
By contrast, weighted distances use city-level data on distances and the geographic distribution
of population (in 2004) inside each nation. The basic idea is to calculate the distance between
two countries as the weighted average bilateral distance between their biggest cities with the corre-
sponding weights determined by the shares of those cities in the overall national populations. This
procedure can be used in a totally consistent way for both internal and external distances. Specif-
ically, the general formula developed by Head and Mayer (2002) calculates the distance between
country l and h as:
dlh =
0@X
p2l
X
r2h
(popp=popl)(popr=poph) (dpr)
1A1= (20)
where popp (popr) designates the population of agglomeration p (r) belonging to country l (h).
The parameter  measures the sensitivity of trade ows to bilateral distance dpr. For the distw
variable,  is set equal to 1. The distwces calculation sets it equal to  1, which corresponds to the
standard distance coe¢ cient estimated from gravity equations. Our benchmark distance variable
is distw. We will show, however, in Section 7.3 that our results are robust to alternative measures
of distance.
For some robustness checks, we will use value added per hour worked in US dollars for our 11
countries by NACE rev.1 industries in the year 2000 as well as the corresponding total amount of
14 In the CEPII database, there are two alternative common language indicators based on di¤erent denitions. One
indicator considers that two countries share a common language as long as at least 20 per cent of the two populations
speak that language. The other one is similar, but the threshold is now between 9 per cent and 20 per cent. We
experimented both indicators getting similar results.
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hours worked for each country-sector cell. These data are available from the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre (GGDC).15 Finally, data on population come from the New Cronos database
provided by EUROSTAT. They refer to the year 2000 in thousands of inhabitants.
5 Calibration
To gauge the impact of trade openness on domestic productivity, we need to recover the parameters
of the model and in particular those of equation (13).
5.1 Trade costs
The starting point of our estimation strategy is the gravity equation (18), which will allow us to get
the freeness of trade matrix Ps, whose generic element is lhs 
 
 lhs
 ks . From equation (18), one
can easily see that the only term that depends on both l and h is lhs . In fact, the other terms either
depend on the origin country only (N lE;s 
l
s), or on the destination country only (L
h
 
chhs
ks+2), or
they are constant (1=[2s (ks + 2)]). Therefore, as in Head and Mayer (2004) and Redding and
Venables (2004), one can isolate the e¤ects of these latter terms by means of dummies for origin
(EX ls) and destination (IM
h
s ) countries.
16 As to the freeness of trade, we follow Head and Mayer
(2004), assuming that lhs = exp(
h+ Langlh) (dlh)s if l 6= h, and lhs = (dlh)s if l = h, where dlh
is distance between l and h, h is a coe¢ cient capturing the fall in trade due to crossing country h
border, and Langlh is a dummy variable that takes value one if l and h share a common language.
In other words, as standard in the gravity literature, trade costs are a power function of distance
while crossing a border or not sharing the same language impose additional costs. Taking the log
of equation (18) we thus get the following regression:
ln(EXP lhs ) = EX
l
s + IM
h
s + s ln(d
lh) + h Borderlh +  LanglhBorderlh + lhs (21)
where Borderlh is a dummy variable that takes value one if l 6= h (border e¤ect). In estimating
21, we use data from years 1999, 2000, and 2001 to run a single regression in which we also put
year dummies. The coe¢ cient on distances is industry specic while the border e¤ect is country
specic. We do not consider country-industry specic border e¤ects because they impose too many
parameters and their estimation would be inaccurate. It is important to stress that the specication
used to estimate lhs gives country-industry-sector specic transportation costs and that in general
lhs 6= hls due to border e¤ects. Moreover, ll is always less than one due to internal distances.
A visual impression of how openness to international trade varies across countries is given by
Figure 1, which shows the average (across sectors and origins) of the estimated lhs excluding 
ll
s ,
i.e. h =
X
s
X
l
^lhs =((M   1)S); for l 6= h. The gure reveals that centrality matters with the
Netherlands and Belgium being the most open countries. Germany, Denmark and Great Britain
are also relatively open, while peripheral Italy, Spain, Norway and Greece are rather closed. The
sectoral variation of trade costs (which is essentially due to the s) is shown in Table 7, which
reports the estimated distance coe¢ cients. The values are in line with previous ndings for Europe
by Head and Mayer (2004). In particular, Printing and publishing as well as Petroleum and
15Respectively, ICOP Database 1997 Benchmark (http://www.ggdc.net) and 60-Industry Database October 2004
(http://www.ggdc.net).
16This xed e¤ectapproach does not su¤er from the specication problems of standard gravity equations discussed
by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). In particular, these authors show that xed e¤ects regressions generate
parameter estimates that are very similar to those obtained using their multilateral resistance terms.
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coal are the least tradable goods while Textiles as well as leather products and footwear are
characterized by the smallest trade costs.
Table 7: Sectoral trade elasticities with respect to distance.
Industry code Industry description s
1 Food beverages and tobacco -1.7434
2 Textiles -1.0527
3 Wearing apparel except footwear -1.3452
4 Leather products and footwear -1.1064
5 Wood products except furniture -2.0185
6 Paper products -1.4278
7 Printing and Publishing -2.4556
8 Petroleum and coal -2.4164
9 Chemicals -1.3820
10 Rubber and plastic -1.6271
11 Other non-metallic mineral products -1.7603
12 Metallic products -1.4470
13 Fabricated metal products -1.7210
14 Machinery except electrical -1.4861
15 Electric machinery -1.1236
16 Professional and scientic equipment -1.5079
17 Transport equipment -1.4588
18 Other manufacturing -1.7206
Average -1.6000
5.2 Total factor productivity
After calculating lhs , we still have to recover the shape parameters of the underlying Pareto distri-
butions of productivity (ks), and the MxS endogenous domestic cut-o¤s chhs . For this we need to
estimate the distributions of rm-level productivities for all sectors and countries. As a benchmark,
we will rely on simple OLS estimations by sector based on the regression
ln(V Ai) = const+ a ln(CAPi) + b ln(EMPLi) + "i (22)
where V Ai is value added, CAPi is capital (xed assets), EMPLi is the number of employees of
rm i and the sector/country indices have been dropped to alleviate the notation. The estimated
productivity of rm i is thus ^Prodi;OLS = exp( ^const + "^i). As robustness check, in Section 7.1
we will show that a more sophisticated estimation methodology of rm productivity, based on
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), yields very similar results.
OLS estimations of productivity are carried out separately for each of the 18 manufacturing
industries considered. However, we do not make separate estimations by country assuming de facto
that countries have the same technology up to a scale factor (Hicks neutral factor augmenting
technology). The evidence provided by Treer (1995) supports this assumption for all countries in
the sample except Portugal.17 Our strategy does not impose any sort of factor price equalization
and has at least two strong empirical advantages. First, it allows us to have a better measure
of productivity as for some countries there are very few country-sector observations. Second, it
17 In unreported estimations, where we exclude Portugal, we nd qualitatively similar results.
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avoids the following problem. If we found the sum of the coe¢ cients a and b to di¤er between two
countries, then our estimated average productivity would turn out to be higher in the country with
the lower sum simply because this would map into a higher value of the constant.18
Table 8 shows average (across rms) OLS productivity by country, as well as per capita income
in PPS.19 As one can see, the two measures are closely related, with the correlation being 0:61. The
table shows that our OLS estimates of productivity are generally in line with aggregate gures. A
notable exception is Germany, whose omission increases the correlation between productivity and
GDP to 0:88. The reason is that both the Amadeus and the MIP databases have a strong bias
towards West German rms, which are known to be much more productive than East German ones.
However, our results on the aggregate gains from trade are not much sensitive to the exclusion of
Germany, so we decided to keep it in the analysis.
Table 8: Productivity across countries: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country OLS Productivity Per capita GDP in PPS
BE Belgium 43.22 104.30
DE Germany 63.63 101.60
DK Denmark 50.26 114.56
ES Spain 32.61 83.78
FI Finland 37.17 102.59
FR France 40.22 103.13
GB Great Britain 38.95 102.14
IT Italy 40.30 99.35
NL Netherlands 42.25 108.53
PT Portugal 24.24 73.08
SE Sweden 34.44 106.91
Average 40.06 100.00
Now that we have ^Prodi;OLS for all rms in the year 2000, we can use them to estimate the
shape parameters ks and the cuto¤s chhs .
20 To estimate the former, it is useful to recall the following
property. Consider a random variable X (our productivity) with observed cumulative distribution
F (X). If the variable is distributed as a Pareto with shape parameter ks, then the OLS estimate
of the slope parameter in the regression of ln(1   F (X)) on ln(X) plus a constant is a consistent
estimator of  ks and the corresponding R2 is close to one.21 Table 9 shows the estimated ks
and the R2 of our regressions by sector. For all sectors the R2 is far above 0:8, which shows
that the Pareto is a fairly good approximation of the underlying productivity distributions, and
the average ks is estimated to be close to 2. Large values of ks characterize sectors in which the
productivity distribution is skewed towards relatively small and ine¢ cient rms (Leather products
and footwear, Wood products except furniture, Rubber and plastic, Fabricated metal products,
Machinery except electrical). Small values of ks are associated, instead, with an even distribution
18The estimated values of a+ b are all between 0:9 and 1:0 and never signicantly di¤erent from 1. They are thus
in line with constant returns to scale.
19Per capita income in PPS should be a better measure of physicalproductivity because it deates nominal values
by country specic price indices.
20One can reasonably argue that considering only one year may be problematic whenever the business cycles do not
coincide across countries. To address such concern, we have also estimated 7-year average individual productivities.
The corresponding results are very similar to the 1-year estimates, so we do not report them.
21See Norman, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1994).
17
of rms across all productivity levels and sizes (Wearing apparel except footwear, Petroleum and
coal, Chemicals, Professional and scientic equipment).22
Table 9: Sectoral ks and the R2 from the regression method.
Industry code Industry description ks R2
1 Food beverages and tobacco 2.004 0.898
2 Textiles 2.248 0.872
3 Wearing apparel except footwear 1.804 0.904
4 Leather products and footwear 2.345 0.893
5 Wood products except furniture 2.454 0.871
6 Paper products 1.966 0.827
7 Printing and Publishing 1.988 0.898
8 Petroleum and coal 1.604 0.862
9 Chemicals 1.811 0.848
10 Rubber and plastic 2.372 0.868
11 Other non-metallic mineral products 2.156 0.826
12 Metallic products 2.206 0.848
13 Fabricated metal products 2.450 0.875
14 Machinery except electrical 2.346 0.898
15 Electric machinery 1.930 0.881
16 Professional and scientic equipment 1.844 0.856
17 Transport equipment 2.062 0.861
18 Other manufacturing 2.128 0.900
Average 2.095 0.871
Turning to the cut-o¤s chhs , these are country and sector specic. In the model, they represent
the highest cost (or equivalently the reverse of the lowest productivity) of active domestic rms.
The maximum likelihood estimator of the cut-o¤ for a Pareto distribution is the minimum observed
value. However, this is probably a rather unreliable method to implement with micro data because
of extreme observations. Consequently, we prefer to use a moment estimator based on the formula
of the mean of a Pareto. Specically, if X is distributed as a Pareto with shape parameter ks and
cut-o¤ x then its mean is E(X) = x ks=(ks   1). Using the country-sector average productivities
and the previously estimated shape parameters, such formula can be inverted to recover all the
productivity cut-o¤s, which are simply scaled average productivities. Finally, in order to pass from
productivity cuto¤s to cost cuto¤s, which are those needed in equation (13), we simply need to
raise the productivity cut-o¤s to the power of minus one.23
5.3 Absolute advantage, product di¤erentiation and entry costs
So far, we have computed lhs (and thus jPsj as well as
C lhs ), ks and chhs . We also have Lh, which is
the population of county h. We still do not know s,  
l
s and f
l
s. However, since we know everything
about (12) except the bundling parameter  ls=(sf
l
s), we can choose its value to t that equation.
22We have also tried alternative estimation techniques for ks, such as the inverse of the standard error of ln(X).
Overall results are very similar.
23Two sectors (number 4 and 8) in Denmark have missing chhs because we do not have observations (rms) for
them. This explains why, in the Tables where we show the results of our simulations, average gains across sectors
and countries do not perfectly match.
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The calibration of the model is now complete.24
5.4 Validation
Before turning to simulations, it is important to evaluate the ability of the model to reproduce some
key properties of the distribution of rm sales and exports that do not underpin the calibration
of  ls=(sf
l
s) or the estimation of ks, 
lh
s and c
hh
s . In so doing, we focus on France for three
reasons. First of all, in the Amadeus+MIP database the coverage and the quality of information
on French rms is above average. Second, we can supplement this information drawing from
the EAE database compiled by the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE), which covers
roughly 25,000 manufacturing rms in the year 2000. Third, Eaton et al. (2004) provide evidence
that French and US rms are very similar in terms of share of exporters, export intensity, etc..
This allows us to rely on the facts presented by Bernard et al. (2003) on US rms to enrich the
descriptions of the moments of the population of French rms our calibrated model should t.
1. The share of rms who export. Eaton et al. (2004) report that 20% of the whole
population of French manufacturing rms (roughly 40,000 out of 200,000) export something
in 1986. This compares with a 21% share of US rms exporting in 1992. We know25 that
the share of French exporters has slightly risen to 22.26 % in 2000. Based on our calibration,
25.58% of French rms should export in 2000, which is very close to the real share. For the
sake of comparison, in Bernard et al. (2003) the simulated share of US exporters in 1992 is
51% while the observed share is 21%.
2. The productivity advantage of exporters. For the US Bernard et al. (2003) report
a 33% productivity advantage of exporters over non-exporters. They use this moment to
calibrate their productivity variance parameter  (closely related to our ks) for which they
nd a value of 3.6. In the EAE database the productivity advantage is a bit smaller (27.32%),
but it is likely to be underestimated as the database essentially covers only French rms with
at least 20 employees and many of them (73%) are exporters. Our model predicts a 68.30%
productivity advantage of exporters. This looks too high. However, it is quite sensitive to
the calibrated value of ks. For example, by re-scaling ks from 2.10 to 3.04 on average, we
can obtain a 33% productivity advantage. In Section 7.4 we will show that the productivity
results of our simulations are pretty robust to changes of such magnitude in ks.
3. The size advantage of exporters. Bernard et al. (2003) report that US exporters sell
4.8 times more than US non-exporters in the domestic market. This gure, however, is likely
to be underestimated because the US Census does not report data for the smallest rms.
The same problem may arise for the EAE database as this covers only 11.26% of all French
manufacturers. According to this database, the size advantage of French exporters over French
non-exporters is 4.33, very similar to the US gure. Our model predicts a size advantage of
7.96, which should be closer to the real number for the whole population of French rms.
24 If one were interested in ranking countries according to their average absolute advantage/entry cost  ls=f
l
s, that
could be obtained by removing the sectoral scaling term s from the calibrated  
l
s=(sf
l
s). Specically, sectoral
scaling could be removed by regressing the logarithm of  ls=(sf
l
s) on a complete set of industry dummies. The
country average of the regression residuals across sectors could then be used as a measure of competitiveness. When
we follow such procedure, we nd that Finland, Sweden and Denmark are the top three countries. Interestingly
enough, these three countries are ranked in the same order as the top European countries in terms of the Global
Competitiveness Index calculated by the World Economic Forum (2005).
25We thank Benjamin Nefussi from INSEE.
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4. The fraction of revenues from export. Eaton et al. (2004) show that the shares of
exporters earning given fractions of their revenues abroad look quite similar in the US and in
France, the only noticeable exception being that in France more exporters (still fewer than 3%)
earn more than 90% of their revenues abroad. The second column of Table 10 is taken from
Bernard et al. (2003) and shows the percentage of exporting rms earning di¤erent shares of
revenues from exports. The third column reports the simulated export intensity of US rms
by Bernard et al. (2003), while the forth column shows the results of our simulations for
France. The actual distribution of export intensity is quite skewed with 66% of the exporters
getting less than 10% of their revenues from abroad. This feature is nicely captured by the
simulations of Bernard et al. (2003), even though these predict that virtually no rm should
sell more than 30% abroad. Our simulations do not match the pronounced skewness of the
distribution of export intensities but predict that some rms will earn more than 30% of their
revenues from abroad. Our t to actual export intensity could be improved if we considered
smaller values of ks but overall the model of Bernard et al. (2003) does a better job in
predicting export intensity.
Table 10: Export Intensity
Export intensity of exporters in % Observed US Simulated BEJK Our Similations
0 to 10 66 76 14.7
10 to 20 16 19 17.2
20 to 30 7.7 4.2 12.7
30 to 40 4.4 0.0 9.7
40 to 50 2.4 0.0 8.6
50 to 60 1.5 0.0 7.4
60 to 70 1 0.0 9
70 to 80 0.6 0.0 12.5
80 to 90 0.5 0.0 8.2
90 to 100 0.7 0.0 0.0
5. Variability in size. In the EAE database, the standard deviation of the log of domestic sales
is 1.30 compared with 0.97 predicted by our calibrated model. We share this problem with
Bernard et al. (2003), who argue that the underestimation may be due to the fact that demand
weights across goods generate additional variability not captured by the models. Accordingly,
in our model rm heterogeneity in productivity would explain 56% of the variance in log
domestic sales. Analogously, since Bernard et al. (2003) report actual (simulated) variance
in log domestic sales equal to 1.67 (0.84), in their model rm heterogeneity in productivity
would explain only 25% of the variance.
6. Variability in productivity. In Bernard et al. (2003), the standard deviation of the log of
value added per worker is about 0.35 in the simulated data while in the actual data it is 0.75.
They argue that an explanation for their underprediction is that measurement error in Census
data generates much more heterogeneity than observed in the actual data. Accordingly,
rm heterogeneity in productivity would explain 22% of the variance in log productivity.
They nonetheless point out that it is someway problematic to attribute so much variability
to measurement error. In our model the variability of productivity is determined by the
estimated value of ks. The overall standard deviation in our log-productivity data is 0.58,
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while the average across sector-based standard deviations is 0.45 meaning that productivity
di¤erences across sectors explain 40% of the overall variability. This implies that another
possible explanation of the underprediction in Bernard et al. (2003) is that they do not break
down manufacturing into di¤erent sectors.
To summarize, our calibrated model not only exhibits key qualitative features of actual data on
export and productivity, but also goes quite far in tting observed magnitudes.
6 Simulation
Having calibrated the model and assessed its t to additional facts, we now turn to the simulation
of the changes in average productivity induced by changes in the freeness of trade. This is achieved
computing the new equilibrium chhs s by (13) as well as the associated average performance variables
by (14) and then comparing them with the initial ones. In particular, we consider two scenarios:
1. A situation in which international trade barriers are prohibitive (i.e. lhs = 0 for l 6= h).
This provides an assessment of the overall costs of non-Europe as measured by foregone
productivity had EU countries become autarkic in 2000.
2. A situation in which international trade costs ( lhs for l 6= h) are reduced by 5 per cent. This
provides an assessment of the gains from (freer) tradein 2000.
6.1 Costs of non-Europe
Table 11 shows the average costs of non-Europeby country. These are measured as minus per-
centage changes in mean productivity (i.e. percentage changes in the cuto¤ chhs ) with respect to
the estimate in the year 2000.
Table 11: Costs of non-Europe by country: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country chhs with trade c
hh
s with no trade % Cost of non-Europe 
h
BE Belgium 0.049 0.059 16.72 0.00028
DE Germany 0.037 0.048 23.29 0.00005
DK Denmark 0.043 0.055 22.29 0.00009
ES Spain 0.058 0.066 11.63 0.00001
FI Finland 0.058 0.067 13.34 0.00002
FR France 0.053 0.061 13.05 0.00002
GB Great Britain 0.060 0.061 3.31 0.00005
IT Italy 0.058 0.061 6.66 0.00001
NL Netherlands 0.051 0.057 12.03 0.00026
PT Portugal 0.090 0.093 4.62 0.00002
SE Sweden 0.068 0.076 11.43 0.00004
Average 0.057 0.064 12.58 0.00008
Based on our simulations, autarky reduces average European productivity by 12:58%. Using
equations (14) we can further map these productivity losses into a 15:83 percentage increases in
average markups and average prices. As less productive and smaller rms are able to enter and
survive, average prots (quantities) fall by 23:26 (31:31) per cent.
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These are sizeable numbers in the light of the share of overall trade occuring among our 11 coun-
tries (54%) and in the light of the corresponding share of national production (22%). Accordingly,
our results suggest that the selection e¤ect is an important channel through which the benets
of international trade materialize. These numbers, however, vary considerably across countries.
Germany, with 23:29%, is the country that loses the most, closely followed by Denmark (22:29%).
At the other extreme, there is Great Britain with a mere 3:31% followed by Portugal (4:62%) and
Italy (6:66%). According to our economic model, such losses are positively correlated (0:26) with
the openness to trade (see h in the last column), so central countries lose more when turning
to autarky. Such correlation is not perfect because of comparative advantage and di¤erent trade
costs across sectors. For example, the big losses of Germany and Denmark are essentially due to
their high underlying productivities (low chhs with no trade) whose benecial e¤ect is magnied by
international trade.
It is interesting to compare our results with those obtained by Eaton and Kortum (2002) for
the same thought experiment in a probabilistic Ricardian framework. Those authors calculate
the fall in productivity (measured as GDP per worker) due to autarky for a sample of 19 OECD
countries in 1990. For our 11 European countries the average decrease in productivity is 3:95%,
much smaller than our 12:58%. The discrepancy may be due to the di¤erent sample of interacting
countries. In particular, OECD countries are generally less integrated than EU ones. Moreover,
Eaton and Kortum (2002) simulate a perfectly competitive model and their base year pre-dates
ours by a crucial decade for European integration.
Table 12: Costs of non-Europe by industry: OLS estimations.
Industry code Industry description chh with trade chh with no trade s % Cost of non-Europ e
1 Food b everages and tobacco 0.096 0.104 -1 .743 8.95
2 Textiles 0 .033 0.040 -1 .053 18.45
3 Wearing apparel except fo otwear 0.042 0.049 -1 .345 16.66
4 Leather products and fo otwear 0.043 0.054 -1 .106 24.17
5 Wood products except furn iture 0.043 0.046 -2 .019 6.51
6 Pap er products 0 .076 0.092 -1 .428 17.37
7 Printing and Publish ing 0.039 0.041 -2 .456 5.92
8 Petro leum and coal 0 .145 0.157 -2 .416 9.51
9 Chem icals 0 .059 0.069 -1 .382 13.96
10 Rubb er and plastic 0 .050 0.056 -1 .627 10.00
11 O ther non-m etallic m ineral products 0 .071 0.079 -1 .760 10.55
12 M etallic products 0 .059 0.066 -1 .447 10.16
13 Fabricated m etal products 0 .039 0.042 -1 .721 8.75
14 Machinery except electrica l 0 .036 0.040 -1 .486 11.23
15 E lectric m achinery 0.055 0.063 -1 .124 14.49
16 Professional and scientic equipm ent 0.042 0.049 -1 .508 14.71
17 Transp ort equ ipm ent 0.064 0.072 -1 .459 12.33
18 O ther manufacturing 0.038 0.042 -1 .721 11.69
Average 0.057 0.064 -1 .600 12.52
Turning to sectoral disaggregation, Table 12 shows the average costs of non-Europe by industry
and compares them with the elasticity of trade ows to distance (s), as obtained from the gravity
equation. In the table losses are positively correlated with the elasticity (0:78): the smaller the
absolute value of the elasticity (i.e. the more a sector is open), the larger the corresponding loss
from autarky.
6.2 Gains from (freer) trade
The e¤ects of a 5 per cent reduction in international trade barriers are reported in Table 13, which
shows the percentage changes in average productivity (gains from (freer) trade) by country and
compares them with the costs of non-Europe. The table shows that the gains from (freer) trade
are highly correlated with the costs of non-Europe(0:90), Portugal being the main exception. As
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before, both accessibility and comparative advantage positively a¤ect the productivity increase due
to a more competitive environment. The overall productivity gain from trade is 2:13%. Again,
equations (14) allow us to compute the decrease in average markups and prices (1:97%), as well
as the increase in average prots (4:61%) and quantities (7:08%), as simple monotonic functions of
the cuto¤s.
The 2:13% productivity gain is a sizeable number, although smaller than the 4:7% productivity
increase obtained by Bernard et al. (2003) for the US when considering the same percentage
fall in trade costs. Besides di¤erences in the underlying models, the fact that the US are a very
productive country may help to explain such discrepancy. Indeed, the two most productive countries
in our sample, Denmark and Germany, experience comparable gains, respectively 4:4% and 4:6%.
Furthermore, the fact that we analyze trade among a smaller set of countries and that we do not
consider intermediate goods, whose price reduction is the main driver of the gains in Bernard et al.
(2003), may also explain why we get smaller impacts.
Table 13: Gains from (freer) trade by country: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country % Gains from trade % Costs of non-Europe
BE Belgium 2.86 16.72
DE Germany 4.60 23.29
DK Denmark 4.40 22.29
ES Spain 2.11 11.63
FI Finland 1.81 13.34
FR France 1.74 13.05
GB Great Britain 0.23 3.31
IT Italy 0.66 6.66
NL Netherlands 1.24 12.03
PT Portugal 2.02 4.62
SE Sweden 1.81 11.43
Average 2.13 12.58
It is also interesting to compare our ndings with those in Smith and Venables (1988), who
simulate the e¤ects of a reduction of intra-EU trade costs in a CGE model with increasing returns to
scale, segmented markets and product di¤erentiation. Firms are identical within countries but they
are allowed to di¤er in size and product lines between countries. Market structure is alternatively
modeled as Cournot or Bertrand competition with free or restricted entry. Thus, while our model
stresses the impact of trade on market share reallocations (selection e¤ect), their model focuses
instead on scale economy exploitation (scale e¤ect). In Smith and Venables (1988) a decline
in trade costs makes competition ercer, decreases prices, and expands sales. Due to increasing
returns to scale, average costs fall, especially with free entry. However, as rms are identical
within countries, no market share reallocations take place towards more productive rms. Though
simulations are run for many industries, only for Domestic electrical equipment reported data
allow for a reasonable comparison with our analysis. In the closest specication to our model,
Smith and Venables (1988) estimate that a 8% reduction in trade costs yields a 0:76% drop in
average production costs. This is smaller than the 1:94% decrease in average costs we nd for
Electric Machineryas response to a 5% reduction in trade costs (see Table 14). We interpret this
di¤erence as capturing the relative importance of the scale and selection e¤ects. Indeed, as argued
by Tybout and Westbrook (1996), the neglect of rm heterogeneity implies that scale e¤ects may
be even overstated in CGE models such as Smith and Venables (1988). On the one hand, exporting
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plants are typically the largest in their industry, so they are not likely to exhibit much potential for
further scale economy exploitation. On the other hand, large plants also account for most of the
production in any industry, so foregone economies of scale due to downscaling in import-competing
sectors are also likely to be minor.
Table 14: Gains from (freer) trade by industry: OLS estimations.
Industry code Industry description % Gains from trade % Cost s of non-Europ e
1 Food b everages and tobacco 1.12 8.95
2 Textiles 3 .16 18.45
3 Wearing apparel except fo otwear 2.52 16.66
4 Leather products and fo otwear 6.40 24.17
5 Wood products except furn iture 0.97 6.51
6 Pap er products 4 .65 17.37
7 Printing and Publish ing 0.71 5.92
8 Petro leum and coal 1 .62 9.51
9 Chem icals 1 .70 13.96
10 Rubb er and plastic 1 .65 10.00
11 O ther non-m etallic m ineral products 1 .72 10.55
12 M etallic products 1 .23 10.16
13 Fabricated m etal products 1 .30 8.75
14 Machinery except electrica l 1 .75 11.23
15 E lectric m achinery 1.94 14.49
16 Professional and scientic equipm ent 2.41 14.71
17 Transp ort equ ipm ent 1.59 12.33
18 O ther manufacturing 1.89 11.69
Average 2.13 12.52
As to the sectoral dimension, Table 14 reports the simulated gains from (freer) trade by
industry as percentage changes in average productivity with respect to the year 2000. These are
compared with the corresponding costs of non-Europe. As expected, the correlation between the
two e¤ects is high (0:91). In particular, the nding that industries with small distance elasticity
gain more from trade liberalization is conrmed.26
7 Robustness checks
In this section we explore how sensitive our results are to alternative measures of productivity
and distance as well as to alternative ways of recovering the shape parameter ks. We will report
only changes in average productivities to save on space. Changes in prices, markups, prots and
quantities are available upon request.
7.1 Individual productivity
In section 5.2 we estimated individual productivity as the exponential of the residual of a simple
OLS regression of (the log of) value added on (the log of) capital and labor. All the results
obtained so far are based on that estimate. We now repeat the analysis relying on a di¤erent
estimation procedure. The aim is to assess the robustness of our ndings when one takes into
account the possible presence of a simultaneity bias in the OLS estimate. The main idea is that a
rm hires capital and labor after having observed the realization of its random TFP. The larger the
realization, the larger the quantities of inputs hired. As long as the realization is unobservable to the
econometrician, the regressors in (22) are thus correlated with the residual of the OLS regression.
26 In unreported simulations we have also considered alternative changes in trade costs, obtaining results that nearly
perfectly correlate with the ones we report. For instance, a 5% increase in international trade costs yields a 1:57%
reduction in average productivity, with correlations with the costs of non-Europeand the gains from (freer) trade
as high as 0:97 and 0:98 respectively.
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Table 15: Productivity across countries: LP estimations.
Country initials Country LP Productivity OLS Productivity
BE Belgium 128.58 43.22
DE Germany 233.03 63.63
ES Spain 115.14 32.61
FI Finland 118.52 37.17
FR France 121.96 40.22
IT Italy 117.92 40.30
NL Netherlands 168.42 42.25
PT Portugal 113.93 24.24
SE Sweden 80.75 34.44
Average 133.14 39.79
The bias can be removed by identifying an observable proxy variable and introducing it as
an additional regressor in (22). The proxy is such that, according to economic theory, it can be
expected to respond to the TFP realization observed only by the rm. Accordingly, the residual of
the new regression is free from any correlation with the inputs due to the asymmetric observability
of realized TFP. This approach, originally proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) using investment
as a proxy, has been recently extended by Levinshon and Petrin (2003) (henceforth LP) using
intermediate inputs instead. Data availability forces us to choose the latter proxy since for our
sample of Amadeus rms there is no information available on investment. Moreover, as information
on the cost of materials is not available for Denmark and Great Britain, also the LP procedure can
be implemented on a sample of 9 countries only. That is why we preferred to rely on OLS in our
benchmark analysis.27
Table 16: Costs of non-Europe by country: LP estimations.
Country initials Country % Costs of non-Europe LP % Costs of non-Europe OLS
BE Belgium 11.30 16.72
DE Germany 22.73 23.29
ES Spain 9.51 11.63
FI Finland 15.19 13.34
FR France 10.78 13.05
IT Italy 5.52 6.66
NL Netherlands 12.19 12.03
PT Portugal 5.35 4.76
SE Sweden 6.09 11.43
Average 10.96 12.54
The LP estimates for the year 2000 are reported in Table 15, which shows the average produc-
tivity by country.28 Although absolute levels are quite di¤erent, the correlation between the OLS
27There is indeed another point that led us to prefer OLS: the returns to scale estimated by LP are in some cases
signicantly smaller than one. This is probably due to the bad measurement of input consumption, whose denitions
may not be homogeneous across countries.
28The relevant capital, intermediates, and value-added deators are used.
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Table 17: Costs of non-Europe by industry: LP estimations.
Industry code Industry description % Cost s of non-Europ e LP % Cost s of non-Europ e OLS
1 Food b everages and tobacco 7.36 7.98
2 Textiles 14.84 18.27
3 Wearing apparel except fo otwear 16.90 18.12
4 Leather products and fo otwear 29.41 29.27
5 Wood products except furn iture 5.84 6.87
6 Pap er products 16.51 18.32
7 Printing and Publish ing 4.98 6.23
8 Petro leum and coal 10.51 11.63
9 Chem icals 12.21 13.40
10 Rubb er and plastic 6 .45 10.10
11 O ther non-m etallic m ineral products 8 .51 9.31
12 M etallic products 9 .05 10.33
13 Fabricated m etal products 6 .77 9.06
14 Machinery except electrica l 12.95 10.75
15 E lectric m achinery 10.60 13.28
16 Professional and scientic equipm ent 10.74 12.70
17 Transp ort equ ipm ent 9.45 12.16
18 O ther manufacturing 8.43 13.31
Average 11.20 12.84
Table 18: Gains from (freer) trade: LP estimations.
Country initials Country % Gains from trade LP % Gains from trade OLS
BE Belgium 1.28 2.86
DE Germany 5.19 4.60
ES Spain 1.56 2.11
FI Finland 2.61 1.81
FR France 1.20 1.74
IT Italy 0.50 0.66
NL Netherlands 1.24 1.24
PT Portugal 0.12 2.46
SE Sweden 0.89 1.81
Average 1.62 2.14
and LP estimates within a sector is around 0.90, so the two estimates di¤er only for a scaling factor,
which is innocuous for our counterfactual analysis. Still, a problem seems to appear for Germany
and Sweden, which are respectively too much and too little productive in the LP estimates with
respect to the OLS ones.
Tables 16, 17 and 18 show the results of our counterfactuals when LP rather than OLS pro-
ductivities are used to calibrate the model. The two former tables report the costs of non-Europe
for countries and sectors respectively. The latter displays the gains from (freer) trade. To ease
comparison, we also report the OLS results for the same countries and sectors.29 The tables show
that results are largely consistent between the LP and OLS simulations. On average, both the
costs of non-Europe and the gains from (freer) trade are smaller when LP productivities are
used, but this is not unexpected because there are missing countries in the LP sample and thus the
potential benets from trade are smaller.
29Four sectors (number 4, 8, 16 and 18) for Portugal have missing chhs because we do not have observations (rms)
for them. This is the reason why, when comparing LP with OLS gains, OLS values for Portugal are slightly di¤erent
from those reported in the previous section. Furthermore, considering that two countries are lost when computing
LP productivities, OLS sectoral gains are also di¤erent from those previously reported.
26
7.2 Aggregate productivity
As shown in Table 1, data coverage in the Amadeus dataset is not very satisfactory for some coun-
tries, namely Denmark, Germany, and Portugal. In the case of Germany we have complemented our
data with additional rm level information provided by ZEW (see Section 4). Nevertheless, even
though we eventually succeed in having a good sample of German rms, an issue of representative-
ness due to small sample size still remains for the other countries. More generally, one could also
argue that, since the Amadeus coverage is generally biased towards large rms, representativeness
is potentially an issue for all our countries.
To address these concerns, we repeat our simulation exercise relying on the country-sector pro-
ductivities provided by GGDC (see Section 4). Under the Pareto assumption, such aggregates
allow us to recover alternative measures of the domestic cuto¤s chhs by adequately scaling up the
corresponding average productivities. The GGCD dataset contains the (producer) price adjusted
value added per hour worked for each of the 18x11 country-sector pairs in US dollars for the year
2000.30 It represents the most accurate and comparable existing record of international produc-
tivities. Compared with our individual estimates, it has the advantage of being based on a very
large rm coverage. Moreover, its productivities are deated by industry-specic purchasing power
parities, which accounts for the fact that prices vary across countries and thus gives a more reliable
measure of physicalproductivities. GGDC productivities, however, do not take into account capi-
tal intensity as we instead do when estimating individual TFP. Moreover, for one sector (Petroleum
and coal) no productivity data is available and we have to restrict our analysis to 17 industries.
Table 19: Costs of non-Europe by country: AP estimations.
Country initials Country % Costs of non-Europe AP % Costs of non-Europe OLS
BE Belgium 26.79 17.14
DE Germany 8.67 24.06
DK Denmark 28.94 22.29
ES Spain 10.43 10.31
FI Finland 22.88 12.80
FR France 25.17 13.20
GB Great Britain 5.81 3.40
IT Italy 12.39 6.98
NL Netherlands 19.72 12.52
PT Portugal 3.30 4.89
SE Sweden 23.89 12.02
Average 17.09 12.69
Tables 19 and 20 show the simulations based on GGDC data together with (comparable) simu-
lations based on individual data.31 In the former table, the average costs of non-Europeincrease
from 12:69 to 17:09 per cent. The correlation between the results based on the two datasets is
0:90 (0:53) if Germany is excluded (included). Hence, an issue of representativeness may exist for
Germany only. Indeed, in the GGDC database, where the coverage is as good for the former East
30Specically, we have combined the ICOP Industrial Database (New Benchmarks), which reports the productivi-
ties, with the 60-Industry Database (October 2004), which reports the total number of hours worked. Data originally
follow the Nace rev.1 classication. We have converted them into our 18-industry classication by weighting the
disaggregated productivities by the total number of hours worked in each Nace industry.
31When simulating the model calibrated on GGDC data, we use the kss from the OLS-based individual productivity
distributions.
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Table 20: Gains from (freer) trade: AP estimations.
Country initials Country % Gains from trade AP % Gains from trade OLS
BE Belgium 11.00 2.98
DE Germany 0.86 4.81
DK Denmark 5.54 4.40
ES Spain 1.48 1.69
FI Finland 7.53 1.71
FR France 14.29 1.79
GB Great Britain 0.59 0.23
IT Italy 2.10 0.69
NL Netherlands 3.82 1.30
PT Portugal 0.55 2.14
SE Sweden 9.15 1.91
Average 5.17 2.15
Germany as for West Germany, German rms are much less productive than in the individual sam-
ple. Once this is controlled for, the overall costs of non-Europeand much more their distribution
across countries seem to be fairly robust. If anything, our benchmark results may underestimate
the overall selection e¤ects. Similar conclusions can be reached for the gains from (freer) tradeby
inspecting Table 20.
7.3 Trade costs
So far we have relied on a specic bilateral distance metric (distw). We now check to what extent
our results depend on such metric. First of all, we simulate the model again for each of the
alternative metrics (distswces, dist and distcap) discussed in Section 4. While all of them account
for internal distances their own way, there is still no general consensus on how to deal with them and
even on whether they should be included at all. For this reason, we also present the results under
the assumption of irrelevant internal distances (lls = 1).
32 Finally, as shown by Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006), the presence of heteroschedasticity and truncation in log-linearized models (such
as a gravity equation) may induce a systematic bias in OLS estimation. Thus, we also estimate
trade costs following the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method they propose using
our preferred distance measure distw as well as internal distances.
Tables 21 and 22 show that, no matter how internal distances are measured, results are essen-
tially unchanged (Columns 3 to 6). When internal distances are, instead, neglected (Column 7),
both the costs of non-Europe(18:20%) and the gains of (freer) trade(5:12%) are considerably
larger than in the baseline case. This is not surprising because omitting internal distances amounts
32With no internal distances, the freeness of trade lhs is still computed on the basis of equation (21) with interna-
tional distances based on distw. However, only observations for which l 6= h are considered and borders e¤ects are
no more identiable. Moreover, to make lhs economically comparable to the assumed 
ll
s = 1, we have to re-scale
the unit of measurement of distance so that, once trade costs are computed with internal distances, the average lls is
still equal to one for each sector. In this respect, it is important to point out that the value of lhs has no absolute
interpretation because of the arbitrariness in the choice of the distance unit. More precisely, the unit of measurement
of distance (which a¤ects the scale of both lls and 
lh
s ) is immaterial for the simulations as long as internal distances
are considered because it simply has a multiplicative e¤ect on all elements of the matrix Ps. What matters, instead, is
the ratio between lls and 
lh
s , which determines the relativedegree of international openness and so the contribution
of foreign competition to selection.
28
Table 21: Costs of non-Europe by country with di¤erent distance measures and estimation tech-
niques.
Country in itia ls Country % non-Europ e % non-Europ e % non-Europ e % non-Europ e % non-Europ e % non-Europ e
BE Belgium 16.72 24.23 24.66 23.71 39.94 23.91
DE Germany 23.29 21.81 26.83 18.63 21.48 26.27
DK Denmark 22.29 29.30 22.31 23.14 39.62 30.50
ES Spain 11.63 8.83 8.10 9.46 7.91 13.80
FI F in land 13.34 12.32 21.58 21.94 19.23 21.77
FR France 13.05 12.73 12.87 14.79 9.70 15.36
GB Great Brita in 3.31 2.99 4.64 5.21 5.09 5.48
IT Italy 6.66 7.35 4.03 4.39 5.76 9.86
NL Netherlands 12.03 16.58 15.39 15.84 30.52 18.12
PT Portugal 4 .62 2.04 4.47 4.45 8.04 7.83
SE Sweden 11.43 10.52 12.06 13.01 12.92 16.70
Average 12.58 13.52 14.27 14.05 18.20 17.24
D istance m easure d istw distwces d ist d istcap no internal d ist. d istw
Estim ation m ethod OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML
Table 22: Gains from (freer) trade by country with di¤erent distance measures and estimation
techniques
Country in itia ls Country % trade gains % trade gains % trade gains % trade gains % trade gains % trade gains
BE Belgium 2.86 6.87 5.65 8.95 33.63 4.08
DE Germany 4.60 4.09 4.85 2.64 1.82 5.54
DK Denmark 4.40 11.27 4.34 4.54 13.88 7.44
ES Spain 2.11 1.53 1.14 1.51 1.24 2.56
FI F in land 1.81 1.83 4.52 4.55 3.65 5.17
FR France 1.74 1.90 1.28 1.46 0.82 1.92
GB Great Brita in 0.23 0.21 0.31 0.33 0.21 0.31
IT Italy 0.66 0.82 0.37 0.41 0.51 0.96
NL Netherlands 1.24 2.06 1.67 1.37 -1 .70 3.61
PT Portugal 2 .02 0.32 1.67 1.50 0.70 0.73
SE Sweden 1.81 1.73 2.46 2.82 1.54 1.54
Average 2.13 2.97 2.57 2.73 5.12 3.08
D istance m easure d istw distwces d ist d istcap no internal d ist. d istw
Estim ation m ethod OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML
to setting border e¤ects to zero, thus increasing the observed international openness. Consequently,
going back to autarky becomes more costly and a given reduction in trade costs corresponds to a
more open environment. Moreover, setting lls = 1 underestimates (overestimates) the degree of
internal freeness of trade in small (large) countries, thus increasing (decreasing) the relative im-
portance of international trade for competition and selection. This is why for small countries like
Belgium and the Netherlands the cost of non-Europe is bigger when all lls are set to 1. Similar ar-
guments apply to PPML-based simulations. A constant outcome of such methodology is to provide
smaller estimates of the distance elasticity (s) with respect to OLS. Therefore, the world appears
to be much more open to trade and autarky is more costly. As in the previous section, if anything,
our benchmark results may underestimate the overall e¤ects.
7.4 Shape parameter
The nal issue we address is the calibration of the shape parameter of the underlying Pareto distrib-
ution of productivity draws (ks). As argued by Bernard et al. (2003), individual TFP productivity
^Prodi is certainly measured with an error. Even if such error were uncorrelated with the true
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productivity Prodi, it should nonetheless deate the value of ks.33 In other words, measurement
errors may make us observe too much TFP variability across rms so that our ks (whose average in
OLS estimations is 2:095) may be too low. Bernard et al. (2003) propose to solve that problem by
reconstructing the parameters of the productivity distribution from aggregate data. In particular,
they recover the shape parameter of their Fréchet distribution by matching the productivity and
size advantage of exporters between simulated and actual US data. Such solution comes at the cost
of imposing more structure. Indeed, one has to believe that not only rm productivity follows a
certain distribution but also all other assumptions (on demand, market structure, etc.), which are
needed to obtain the average productivity of exporters from the theoretical model, hold. While we
consider our approach as more reliable, we nd it useful to check how sensitive our results to the
potential mismeasurement of ks.
Unfortunately we do not have reliable export data in the Amadeus database, so we can not
exploit the size and the productivity advantage of exporters as Bernard et al. (2003) do. Therefore,
we simply check how our benchmark results change when we adopt their value ks = 3:6, which is
the same for all sectors since their analysis has no sectoral disaggregation. It is important to remark
that we can use their estimate because the Fréchet and the Pareto distributions are closely related.
Indeed, in their model, where only the lowest cost supplier is active in any particular country, if all
potential suppliers draw their costs from an unobservable Pareto distribution with shape parameter
ks, then the corresponding observable extreme value distribution is precisely a Fréchet distribution
with shape parameter ks.
Table 23: Costs of non-Europe by country with di¤erent ks: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country % Costs of non-Europe % Costs of non-Europe % Costs of non-Europe
BE Belgium 17.68 16.29 16.72
DE Germany 22.89 26.76 23.29
DK Denmark 23.20 21.20 22.29
ES Spain 11.56 13.94 11.63
FI Finland 14.15 13.22 13.34
FR France 13.60 13.77 13.05
GB Great Britain 3.59 4.39 3.31
IT Italy 6.87 8.31 6.66
NL Netherlands 12.64 12.58 12.03
PT Portugal 4.97 5.27 4.62
SE Sweden 12.73 10.35 11.43
Average 13.08 13.28 12.58
ks our kss reduced by 20% ks = 3:6 for all s our kss
There is, however, a di¤erent reason why our calibration of ks may instead be too high. In our
model more (physically) productive rms set lower prices, so they do not entirely translate their
higher productivity into higher values of sales per worker. Therefore, our productivity estimation,
which, as standard, is based on the value of sales or value added, may underestimate (overestimate),
33The variance of a Pareto distribution is a decreasing function of ks. In particular, if X is distributed as a Pareto
with shape parameter ks, the standard error of ln(X) is 1=ks. A simple way to recover ks is thus to consider the
standard error of ln( ^Prodi) = ^const + "^i. Clearly, as long as there is an uncorrelated measurement error in the
estimates of const and "i, the standard error of the variable ^const + "^i is greater than that of const + "i, and so ks
is underestimated.
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Table 24: Gains from (freer) trade with di¤erent ks: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country % Gains from trade % Gains from trade % Gains from trade
BE Belgium 2.24 3.06 2.86
DE Germany 2.99 13.24 4.60
DK Denmark 3.28 15.78 4.40
ES Spain 1.40 5.93 2.11
FI Finland 1.40 5.63 1.81
FR France 1.31 5.02 1.74
GB Great Britain 0.19 -0.71 0.23
IT Italy 0.51 1.14 0.66
NL Netherlands 0.96 4.15 1.24
PT Portugal 1.03 -0.90 2.02
SE Sweden 1.34 0.19 1.81
Average 1.51 4.78 2.13
ks our kss reduced by 20% ks = 3:6 for all s our kss
the TFP of more (less) productive rms, thus reducing the observed variance of productivity and
overstating ks. This potential bias is studied by Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005), who
present the only TFP research we know that relies on rm-level physical quantities. They nd that
at plant level physical productivities are inversely correlated with prices so that the standard error
of (the ln of) revenue-based TFP is lower than the one of the output-based TFP, as predicted by
our model. However, they also nd that the correlation between revenue-based and output-based
TFPs is not negligible (0:64) and the bias in terms of standard errors of (the ln of) productivities,
which is all that matters for our ks, is rather small (0:20).34
Tables 23 and 24 respectively compare our benchmark results on the costs of non-Europeand
the gains from (freer) tradewith those obtained by either reducing all our kss by 20 per cent in
the wake of Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005) or attributing ks = 3:6 to all sectors in the
wake of Bernard et al. (2003). This amounts to increasing our average ks by 70 per cent from
its OLS value of 2:1. In general, one should not expect the productivity gains from selection to
change monotonically with ks as two opposing e¤ects operate. On the one hand, for given trade
freeness, as ks grows the impact of selection on productivity becomes stronger because the cost
distribution becomes more skewed towards less productive rms. On the other hand, for a given
cost distribution, as ks grows trade freeness lhs =
 
 lhs
 ks falls, which weakens rm selection. Non-
monotonicity characterizes Table 23 as both reducing and increasing ks slightly raise the average
costs of non-Europe, although this is not the case for all countries. Table 24 shows, instead, that
the average gains from (freer) tradechange monotonically with ks, although this is not the case
for all countries. Overall, our simulations suggest that correcting ks for the 20-per-cent upward
bias changes our results only slightly, whereas imposing ks = 3:6 increases substantially only the
gains from (freer) trade. The main reason for this behavior is that a 5 per cent reduction in trade
costs ( lhs ) translates into di¤erent increases in trade openness (
lh
s ) depending on the level of ks.
Once more, if anything, our benchmark results may underestimate the overall selection e¤ect.
Note that the fact that the costs of non-Europechange little with ks is due to free entry and exit
as prospective entrants anticipate the e¤ects of ks on selection. This shows that the adjustment in
34The problem of the unobserved price bias is highlighted by Klette and Griliches (1996). Melitz (2000) proposes
a correction based on a simple CES Dixit-Stigliz model with constant markups. Unfortunately the complexity of our
model with variable markups prevents us from applying any simple comparable correction.
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the number of entrants enriches the industry dynamics with respect to what is already highlighted
by Bernard et al. (2003).
8 Conclusion
We have calibrated a multi-country multi-sector model with heterogeneous rms, monopolistic
competition and variable markups on rm-level data and trade gures for a panel of 11 EU countries.
We have provided evidence that the model ts reasonably well some key moments of the observed
distributions of rm sales and exports. When simulating di¤erent integration scenarios, we have
found that in the year 2000 an increase of trade barriers to prohibitive levels would have caused
an average productivity loss of roughly 13 per cent, associated with a 16 per cent average increase
in both prices and markups as well as a fall of 23 (31) per cent in average prots (quantities). On
the other hand, a 5 per cent reduction in trade costs, would have raised average productivity by
roughly 2 per cent, leading to a 2 per cent average decrease in both prices and markups as well as
a 5 (7) per cent increase in average prots (quantities). These estimates have been shown to be
fairly robust to alternative measures of productivity and trade costs. Indeed, the robustness checks
overall suggest that, if anything, those numbers may actually underestimate the overall selection
e¤ects. This reveals that the Darwinian selection of the best rms is an important e¤ect of trade
liberalization that has still to deliver its full potential even in an integrated areas such as the EU.
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